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Nationalism, Identity and 
Democracy in Japan
by Emily Schulman
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apan’s unique and modern democracy did not 
manifest itself smoothly.  Its first attempt at de-
mocratization was sparked by the Western threat 
exemplified by the Unequal Treaties and reversed 
by a military coup that shaped Japan intoJ
Taylor Gymnasium (1904 & 
1913)
The arched entrance to the 
building used to be an open 
gateway tunnel to the former 
football stadium. The stadium’s 
stairs were never removed, 
instead they were covered, 
forming a hillside that many a 
student has sledded down on a 
lunch tray.
Wilbur Powerhouse (1908)
Until its renovation in the 
1970’s Wilbur served as a power 
plant to Lehigh’s campus. A 
vast network of underground 
steam tunnels (some large 
enough to walk through) con-
nects the building with almost 
every major structure on Asa 
Packer Campus.
a militaristic and imperialistic 
country that was not defeated 
until the United States dropped 
two atomic bombs on it.  Its 
second attempt at democratiza-
tion has proven durable, although 
the country is now stripped of 
its military power and the cur-
rent government was styled by 
the American occupation in the 
post-World War II era.  Clearly, 
external influences have played a 
large role in the democratization 
of Japan.  There is still a question 
of which factors, and to what ex-
tent the external world played in 
its influence of this highly unified 
country.  Further, how can external 
dimensions explain why that de-
mocratization reversed in Japan’s 
first attempt and proved success-
ful in the second attempt?
The first attempt toward democ-
ratization in Japan started after 
Japan began to view the West as a 
concrete threat when Britain went 
to war with China in the Opium 
War of 1840, which opened Chi-
nese ports to foreign trade.  Brit-
ain, France, Russia, and the United 
States now had an open door to 
easily exploit Japan.  These for-
eign powers devised “unequal 
treaties” under which Japan was 
forced to make large concessions 
to the West.  The foreign merchan-
dise that entered Japan facilitated 
the economic crisis that would 
contribute to the downfall of the 
Tokugawa Regime in 1868.
In War and the Rise of the State, 
Bruce Porter discusses how the 
Napoleonic wars of the early 
nineteenth century marked the 
end of feudalism and the dawn 
of the “modern warfare” state 
(Porter 145-146).  The institutions 
and tools for the modern-warfare 
state were implemented wher-
ever Europe had interests and 
influence.  Porter says, “There 
was, however, one non-European 
country, and one only, that re-
acted to the encroachments of 
the imperial powers with such 
a determined course of military 
and political modernization that 
it rapidly won acceptance as 
their equal: the island kingdom of 
Japan” (146).  As a country with a 
tradition of isolation, and a strong 
national identity, Japan was willing 
to do anything during the Meiji 
Restoration, which ruled Japan 
after the Tokugawa regime fell, in 
order to ensure its military equal-
ity with Western powers.  There is 
an interesting juxtaposition here 
between the internal and external 
factors for this extreme process 
of modernization.  The process 
would not have begun without 
the western threat, yet external 
factors cannot explain why Japan 
decided it must modernize, while 
other countries, like neighboring 
China, lived in denial of the grow-
ing imperative to modernize.  
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Japan was able to compromise its identity because its 
identity was so unified and easily defined.  
Japan did not lose its identity in the modernization 
process.  Porter and Lynch’s theories on democratiza-
tion fit together nicely here.  Porter discusses how war 
in Europe led to the evolution of the modern war-state 
that Europe spread throughout the world.  Some coun-
tries responded better to this imposition than others, 
but no state ran with the idea as fervently as Japan.  
Japan’s reaction is explained by Lynch, who says that 
Japan acted as any gate-keeper state would.  Although 
Lynch can explain why Japan modernized, he cannot 
explain why Japan modernized with such intensity.  I 
argue that Japan acted dramatically because of the 
strength of Japan’s national identity.  Porter supports 
this argument when he describes the goal of Meiji 
leaders.  Porter says the goal was to “defeat the bar-
barian by using the barbarian” (Porter 146).  
The country borrowed the administrative style of 
France and the military style of Germany.  It devel-
oped an officer training school, borrowed the Western 
practice of conscription, and created a cabinet.  All of 
these practices led to the democratization of the state, 
but also aided in the unraveling of the fledgling de-
mocracy in the early twentieth century.  The Meiji Res-
toration, which was so obsessed with the industrializa-
tion and centralization of the government and military, 
was not concerned in the least with democracy; it was 
concerned with protecting the identity of Japan.  The 
Meiji Restoration created the institutions that could 
house democracy based on its efforts to face the 
Western threat.  Japan wanted to modernize as a form 
of protection.  Any democratization was based on this 
attempt to appear modern to the West, not to actually 
give power to the people of Japan.
There was a shift, after Emperor Meiji died in 1912, 
and the original elites that ruled the new bureaucracy 
were gradually replaced with younger and more ideo-
logically liberal intellectuals who had an interest in 
democratizing the country, due to increasing urban-
ization and the influence of Western ideas.  The de-
mocratization process lost its original purely respon-
sive and defensive nature.  These ideas inevitably 
influenced younger Japanese elites, despite the lack 
of interest that the original elites in the Meiji Restora-
tion had in these ideas.  Efforts to democratize were 
facilitated by the young and inept Emperor Taisho 
who did not try to inhibit the intellectual’s efforts.  As 
the last original “genros,” or founding fathers, of the 
Meiji Restoration died in early 1920’s, the Taisho de-
mocracy entered its golden age.  At this time, suffrage 
was established for all men, a two party system began 
to develop, and the prime minister was now expected 
to be a member of one of the parties represented in 
the diet (Ishida 7).
Although the threat of the West caused the mod-
ernization and democratization process, there were 
clearly internal processes of democratization occur-
ring during this time period.  Japan did not remain 
a democracy for long.  Ishida and Krauss assert that 
both domestic and international crisis played a role 
in the disintegration of the Taisho democracy, which 
ended in 1926.  Just like Japan’s democratization was 
sparked by a Western threat, Japan’s reversal was 
sparked by the worldwide economic depression of 
the early 1930’s.  The fledgling democracy could not 
handle this crisis, which revealed weaknesses within 
the domestic government.  The political parties were 
dominated by big business in the city and the gov-
ernment could not react to the desperate poverty in 
the countryside, which left the parties without sup-
port (Ishida 8).  Government simply could not react 
like older and more stable democracies could.  This 
reveals a pattern.  The Tokugawa regime could not 
handle the Western threat and it was left behind as 
Japan modernized.  Now, the government would shift 
again to meet the state’s new needs.  
Not only did the Japanese government face prob-
lems at home, but its aggressive foreign policy led 
to isolation abroad as well, particularly after Japan 
invaded Manchuria in 1931.  International isolation 
combined with the extreme poverty at home mixed to 
create a good environment for the Japanese to recede 
from democracy and rally around the Emperor and a 
nationalist and collectivist mentality.  Japan attributed 
the problems within the country to the worldwide de-
pression.  It then was faced with diplomatic isolation 
when the League of Nations disapproved of the inva-
sion of Manchuria, which led to feelings of alienation 
and resentment.  Rulers trying to transform Japan into 
a fascist and militarized government easily exploited 
this hostility at a time of hopeless poverty, which was 
also attributed to the West.  They turned it into anti-
western and nationalist propaganda for the masses to 
rally around.  
The weak institutions that hurt Japan’s democratiza-
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tion effort could not protect the fledgling democracy 
because Japanese democratization essentially be-
gan as a defense policy.  When democracy ceased to 
be a tool to ensure Japanese power on a worldwide 
scale, democracy ceased to be.  The rise of fascism in 
Europe certainly aided the push away from democ-
racy (8).  Right-wing groups began executing terrorist 
attacks on the government and assassinating officials.  
They were largely unsuccessful, but these outbursts 
acted as an excuse for the military to gradually 
increase its control in the government.  After Japan 
invaded China in 1937, the military took over the 
government and reorganized it into a fascist state (8).  
Fascism was different in Japan than in Germany and 
Italy because it came from above, rather than from a 
mass movement.  So, although Japan certainly looked 
toward the West and saw examples of fascism, Japan 
became fascist in its own top-down style which was 
accomplished by military elites.  Authority descend-
ing from the top is deep in Japan’s Confucian, feudal, 
and industrializing tradition.  In its reversal, Japan 
reacted to internal and external factors in a way that 
the Japanese perceived was best to ensure its security 
and the most amount of power it could achieve on an 
international scale.  
The military success of the new military govern-
ment helped to ensure the government’s stability (33). 
Mansfield and Snyder say, 
“The Japanese army invented a populist ideology, 
rooted in the nation’s imperial myths, designed to so-
lidify the army’s links to a rural mass constituency and 
to denigrate the commercially-oriented Taisho demo-
crats.  Thus, the foreign policy of these autocratizing 
states was at least partially shaped by the character of 
the democratic political they were escaping” (35).
The military success of the new government was 
proof that the fascist government could bring Japan 
security and dominance more effectively than the past 
government.   
The military success did not last.  Japan was defeat-
ed by the allies in World War II in 1945, which placed 
the nation back onto the road of democratization.  It is 
impossible to even speculate about what Japan’s gov-
ernment would have been like if the United States had 
not occupied the state, stripped it of its military power 
and singlehandedly reorganized its government.  The 
United States involvement was all encompassing.  
Even so, there are a couple of variables besides the 
United States’ involvement that should be analyzed 
when discussing the second democratization of Japan 
in the post World War II era.
Mark E.  Pietrzyk discusses the reason that Japan 
was so willing to be dependent on the United States 
after World War II.  He says:
“The acceptance by…Japan of the status of depen-
dencies does seem to violate the premise that states 
are always trying to maximize their power.  However, 
it is not so clear that this acceptance is due to de-
mocracy.  Historically, states have often accepted 
hegemonic leadership if that leadership is perceived 
as legitimate and the costs of challenging it appear 
high” (Pietrzyk 50).
In this selection, Pietrzyk explains his issues with 
the democratic peace theory: democracies do not go 
to war against other democracies.  Within the context 
of Japan, Pietrzyk says that if democratic peace theory 
was true then there would have been no need for the 
United States to remain in Japan after the democracy 
was established.  
Pietrzyk fails to recognize that democratic peace 
theory is not going to work if states do not remain 
democratic.  The United States occupied Japan for 
an extended time period to ensure the stability of 
the state.  Democratization reversed once in Japan in 
some ways due to Western neglect and it could have 
happened again if the United States did not remain 
there.  For the same reason, the United States made 
sure that Japan was totally demilitarized and included 
in the state’s constitution that Japan did not have the 
right to declare war.   If the United States followed the 
democratic peace theory, then it would not need to 
worry whether or not Japan had weapons or an abil-
ity to wage war.  Establishing a democracy does not 
ensure lasting stability.  To ensure peace, the United 
States made sure another military takeover of the gov-
ernment was not possible.
Japan’s strong national identity contributed to the 
ease in which the military could rally national support 
for a militaristic agenda.  As evidenced by the coun-
try’s rapid modernization and then rapid militariza-
tion, Japan consistently tried to gain as much power 
as possible on an international scale.  After its defeat 
in World War II, the smartest action for Japan to take 
in order to gain power for itself was to ally itself with 
the U.S.  hegemon.  Although Japan was forced to give 
up its military power, the nation used its relationship 
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were less on how to create a suc-
cessful democracy and more on 
the importance of being a democ-
racy in order to ensure a positive 
relationship with the United States 
and a prominent role in the inter-
national economy.
Huntington attributes part of 
Japan’s democratization success 
to the fact that the change was 
more of a “generational change” 
than an “opinion change” (265).  
Although the United States forced 
a democracy on Japan, the peo-
ple’s support of democracy did 
not transition as quickly as the 
actual government did.  Hunting-
ton argues that it took about two 
decades for the people to grow 
into the democracy that the United 
States created (264).  The exter-
nally implemented democracy 
produced supporters of democ-
racy.  The new generation was 
raised within the civil and educa-
tional tradition of democracy, and 
thus it supported the democracy 
more than the earlier genera-
tion who had not been raised in a 
democratic tradition.  The genera-
tional change theory explains why 
democracy stuck in Japan better 
than the second try theory.  If the 
second try theory held true for 
the Japanese case, than the first 
generation would have been more 
receptive to change and the gen-
erational change would have been 
less prominent.  
It is important to note that 
although the United States imple-
mented democratization, the 
A rock resembling George Wash-
ington in Sayre Park from 1909.  
Courtesy of Special Collections, 
Lehigh University Libraries.
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external imposition could not 
change the generation of Japanese 
who were not used to democracy.  
There had to be a cultural transi-
tion that could only occur with 
time.  Thus, if the United States 
had created the democracy and 
left without eliminating the mili-
tary, it is very possible that the 
democracy would not have con-
tinued.  A tradition of democracy 
is necessary for democracy to 
remain, especially an externally 
implemented one.  This fact makes 
the first stage of democratization 
extremely important.  It explains 
why externally implemented 
democracies fail in most cases, 
with the exception of Japan and 
Germany after World War II where 
external involvement was more 
intense than any other case.
Despite United States occu-
pation, Japan’s unique form of 
democracy reflects the nation’s 
traditional values.  Japan is his-
torically a Confucian state which 
stresses the values of “the group 
over the individual, authority over 
liberty, and responsibilities over 
rights…In Japan, Confucian values 
were reinterpreted and merged 
with its autochthonous cultural tra-
dition” (300-301).  Japan has never 
had a true party-turnover, which is 
considered one of the key aspects 
of democracy, but Japan is univer-
sally considered a democracy.  It 
managed to fuse Confucian values 
with democratic values.  From a 
Western perspective, it seems 
impossible that a country that 
does not value liberty can still be 
a democracy, but no democracy is 
perfectly democratic.  Japan’s sin-
gle-party democracy works within 
the Japanese culture.  There is one 
brief exception to Japan’s one-
party democracy.  The collapse of 
Japan’s bubble economy in 1992 
triggered Japan’s worst recession 
since the end of WWII, and the 
38-year rule of the LPD was ended 
by a seven-party coalition  (Wan 
87).  The LPD was back in power 
shortly after, though.  The brief 
period when the LPD was not in 
power shows that Japan’s democ-
racy may develop into a democ-
racy that has more regular party 
turnover.  Still, Japan’s single-
party democracy shows that even 
with an externally implemented 
democracy, Japan’s strong identity 
has not been lost.
Tony Smith argues that one of 
the reasons the democratization of 
Japan was successful was because 
its “modern character as industri-
al societ[y] had already been es-
tablished” (Smith 147).  Although 
the first attempt at democratiza-
tion did not impact the second, the 
fact that Japan was already mod-
ernized did play a large role in 
the success of the second attempt 
at democratization.  
Smith discusses post-World 
War II Japan as a country that the 
United States could transform into 
whatever form it pleased.  There 
were plans to make it a power-
less agrarian nation, or a military 
power that could balance the So-
viet Union.  In the end, the policy 
was a compromise between these 
two extremes: demilitarization, 
democratization, decartelization, 
and deprogramming (Smith 154).  
Democratization was dependent 
on these other concepts.  Smith 
says, “Occupation authorities had 
a shared understanding that po-
litical reform was the heart of the 
democratization process” (155).  
The United States was conscious 
of Japan’s own democratic tra-
dition, and the new institutions 
followed more of a British model 
rather than an American model—
another example of how Japan re-
tained its identity throughout the 
democratization process (157).
The American occupation at-
tempted to change the Japanese 
identity, though.  The turn from mili-
tarism and toward democracy was 
aided by the purge of individuals 
active during the war.  Smith says:
“The fact remains that barring 
individuals from political and eco-
nomic life, like preventing the or-
ganization of parties, championing 
the old regime, contributed more 
than marginally to the promotion 
of democracy in both countries 
[Germany and Japan].  The purges 
allowed new elites to arise and 
new parties on the democratic 
right to woo voters who might 
otherwise have adopted extremist 
positions away from their wartime 
sympathies” (158).
Smith discusses that disband-
ing the military also played a 
significant role turning Japan 
away from extremist positions, but 
these purges were able to set a 
new tone for the new government.  
Although there is criticism that 
the purges could have been more 
thorough, they contributed to the 
“generational change” discussed 
earlier.  The United States created 
a democratic environment, which 
was received by the new genera-
tion.  If the most extreme mem-
bers of the old generation had 
been able to play active roles in 
the government, this generational 
change would not have been 
possible and it is this change that 
has allowed stable democracy in 
Japan.  
72
The United States needed to shift Japan from what 
it was, a militaristic and fascist state, to a peace-
ful democracy, but the United States would not and 
could not totally destroy the Japanese identity.  The 
new constitution, written by MacArthur and his staff, 
“converted the emperor into a constitutional mon-
arch and abolished the peerage.  It vested supreme 
power in the Diet, now made wholly responsible to the 
people organized by competitive party elections.  A 
bill of rights was formulated, whose assumptions of 
individual and group freedom clashed with basic col-
lectivist values enshrined in Japanese culture” (159).  
It is hard to say whether Japan would have been better 
or worse off if the bill of rights was more in line with 
the nation’s collectivist values.  Because the Japanese 
people gradually grew into the institutions that the 
United States implemented, it did not matter as much 
what rights were written down.
Japan faced economic problems after the war and 
the United States placed “exaggerated responsibility” 
(161) on Japanese industrial and financial firms for 
the past militarism of the country.  The United States 
struggled to help the economy and break up the 
country’s cartels so that it would be possible for Japan 
to have a liberal democracy.  Unfortunately, “Ameri-
can attempts to address socioeconomic obstacles to 
The Lehigh Review: “A Lee-Eye View”.  Courtesy of Spe-
cial Collections, Lehigh University Libraries
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democratization encountered some serious problems: 
trust-busting, reparations, and purges in Japan…
so disrupted economic life that the population grew 
discounted, which in turn threatened efforts to bring 
about stable democratic political life” (161).  Japan’s 
economy was dominated by zaibatsu (large con-
glomerates) and destroying the zaibatsu was largely 
unsuccessful, at least in the long term.  The zaibatsu 
reflect Japanese rather than Western values.  The 
United States was not able to liberalize the Japanese 
economy to the extent that it wanted partially because 
of this values clash.  Further, the United States reform 
strategy became more conservative in the early 1950’s 
because of the Korean War and fears of communism.
The United States was successful to an extent and 
the liberalization of the economy helped to ensure 
government stability.  In particular, Smith says the 
United States instituted land reform and opened up 
world markets, while encouraging self-sufficiency to 
a certain extent.  Today, Japan is seen as one of the 
world’s major economic powers.  Japan’s economic 
success helps to protect its democracy, contrasting 
the economic failure that brought about the Taisho 
Democracy’s downfall.  Japan’s economy had ups and 
downs in the 1990s, but the democracy remained sta-
ble, which is a good sign for the current government.
Smith also discusses the effort to psychologi-
cally “deprogram” (166) the Japanese people mostly 
through education reform so their values would coin-
cide with democratic values.  The most effective way 
to “deprogram” is through the success of the demo-
cratic institutions and a liberalized economy.  Cur-
rently, Japanese textbooks minimize Japan’s involve-
ment in World War II.  Still, Japan found a way to make 
the democracy its own, and wield power through the 
economy rather than the military.  
Japan maintained its strong national identity from 
the Unequal Treaties through the occupation and 
today.  The country is a democracy, but it is its own 
democracy.  It has retained a strong sense of national 
identity, despite its externally imposed government.  
Now, the government has fully developed institutions 
that stabilize the democracy and it is hard to imag-
ine another reversal, especially because it would be 
disruptive to the large role that Japan has in the world 
economy.  Japan was democratized by the United 
States, but it has remained and is uniquely Japanese 
because of Japan’s strong and unique national identity. 
